In this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a diagrammatical exposition of matching mechanisms and their effects on public good supply and welfare. In particular, we describe, on the one hand, for which income distributions interior matching equilibria result and, on the other hand, for which income distributions the agents voluntarily participate in a matching mechanism. As a novel result, we especially show that the "participation zone" is larger than the "interiority zone". Abstract: In this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a diagrammatical exposition of matching mechanisms and their effects on public good supply and welfare. In particular, we describe, on the one hand, for which income distributions interior matching equilibria result and, on the other hand, for which income distributions the agents voluntarily participate in a matching mechanism. As a novel result, we especially show that the "participation zone" is larger than the "interiority zone".
Introduction
The Kolm triangle (see [1] , Chapter 9) is a well-known and frequently used graphical device to visualize public good allocations in an economy with two agents (see [2] , [3] and [4] ). The advantage of the Kolm triangle approach, as compared to most other graphical methods for representing allocations in a public good economy, is that the aggregate budget constraint, the levels of both agents' private consumption, and the level of public good supply directly show up in the same diagram. 1 The Kolm triangle method has been particularly helpful to describe the Nash equilibrium in the case of non-cooperative public good provision and to compare this outcome with Pareto efficient public good allocations. Furthermore, the Kolm triangle approach facilitates the analysis of mechanisms for attaining an efficient public good allocation like the Lindahl equilibrium (see [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] and [13] ) as well as the study of preconditions and limitations faced by such mechanisms (see [14] ). In this vein, we will show in this paper, how the Kolm triangle approach can be applied to "matching", which is another widely discussed approach aiming at improving public good allocation.
Following the seminal work of [15] , matching in a public good economy means that agents subsidize the other agents' direct ("flat") public good contributions, about which the agents decide non-cooperatively as in the standard case of voluntary public good supply. By reducing the effective personalized public good price of the "matched" agents, matching leads to a Nash equilibrium with higher public good supply (see [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , and [23] ).
The objective of this paper is to show that the Kolm triangle method allows for a catchy and intuitive graphical illustration of important features of matching mechanisms, which to a certain extent have already been treated analytically in the literature. That the functioning of matching schemes is quite often analyzed for public good economies with only two agents (see [24] , [8] , [25] and [26] ) fits well to applying the Kolm triangle approach for an analysis of matching mechanisms. 1 The most common visualization of public good allocations in a two-person economy uses a diagram with a horizontal and a vertical axis, in which the public good contributions of two agents are plotted at the two axis (see, e.g., [5] , p. 154) but in which the level of public good supply does not show up directly. Alternative approaches are the use of a triangular Edgeworth box (e.g. [6] , or [7] ), which has some similarities with the Kolm triangle, or the use of a double diagram with public good supply at the vertical axis and private consumption of two agents at the horizontal axis going to the right and to the left, respectively (e.g. [8] ). In this visualization, however, the budget constraint only appears indirectly.
We will proceed as follows: After describing the Kolm triangle approach in Section 2, we apply it in Section 3 to depict the changes in private consumption and public good supply that are implied by matching when both agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. Yet such interior matching equilibria can only be expected for specific distributions of income between the two agents as has been shown in [27] . In Section 4, the range of income distributions, for which interiority prevails, is described in the Kolm triangle for the special case in which both agents have the same preferences. In Section 5, we then deal with corner matching equilibria especially focusing on the participation constraint, i.e. on the requirement that both agents are made better off through matching as compared to the original Nash equilibrium without matching. The fulfillment of the participation constraint, which sets limits to the application of a matching mechanism, also depends on the income distribution.
For the description of this dependency (and its comparison with the conditions for interiority of the matching equilibrium) the Kolm triangle also turns out to be particularly useful and helps to present a novel contribution to the matching literature.
The Kolm triangle approach
We assume that there are two agents x is the length of the perpendicular from E to the side AB , 2 x is the length of the perpendicular from E to side AC and G is the length of the perpendicular from E to the triangle's base side BC . A general geometric fact then implies that the sum of these barycentric coordinates sum up to the height of the equilateral triangle, i.e. that 1 2 x x G W    holds and thus the feasibility constraint is satisfied and no resources are wasted. In the Kolm triangle, agent 1's indifference curves are bending downwards and convex, while the indifference curves of agent 2 are bending upwards and convex as depicted in Figure   1 for the indifference curves running through point E . (How the indifference curves in the Kolm triangle are obtained from the standard indifference curves in an 1 x -G -diagram is described in detail by [4] .)
Interior matching equilibria
After having described the Kolm triangle method in general we will use another Figure ( ) e  , which characterizes the new matching equilibrium, thus is located on 2 1 ( ) e  northwest of the original matching equilibrium, so that is further away from the triangle sides BC and AC . Therefore, it is obvious from Figure 3 that an increase of the matching rate 2  leads to an increase both of public good supply and private consumption of agent 2, which entails that agent 2 becomes better off. Private consumption of the matched agent 1 is reduced instead. A simultaneous increase of agent 1's matching rate 1  would clearly increase public good supply in the matching equilibrium still further, which in Figure 3 leads to the matching equilibrium .
Starting from the Nash equilibrium without matching these considerations in particular
show that in the case of interior matching equilibria the introduction of a matching mechanism mitigates the underprovision problem, actually the more the higher the matching rates are.
However, with higher matching rates the range of income distributions, for which interior matching equilibria in fact result, is shrinking. Using the Kolm triangle, we will show this in the next section for the special case where utility functions and matching rates are identical for both agents. This specification allows us to focus on the impact the income distribution has on the matching equilibria, which is the central topic of this paper.
Interiority and the income distribution
In this section it is assumed that both agents have the same utility function ( , )
i u x G and that there is reciprocal matching with the uniform matching rate (see Figure 4) . The symmetric interior matching equilibrium, which results in this case, is characterized by identical private consumption levels ( ) x  of both agents and public good supply
It follows from the analysis in Section 2 that ( ) G  is increasing in the matching rate  , so that the point ( ) M  is moving upwards in the Kolm triangle when  increases. Private
then clearly is falling in the matching rate  .
Figure 4: Interiority zones
We now show how the range of income distributions for which ( ) M  actually is the interior matching equilibrium depends on  . To this end, we first of all note that for some given matching rate  , the minimum income ( ) a w  , at which an agent starts to make a positive flat contribution to the public good, is determined by
This follows since an agent with income ( ) In Figure 4 , the "interiority zone" IZ for the given matching rate This shows that attaining a Pareto optimal solution through matching only is possible for a very specific distribution of income.
The transition from 0   to 1   thus makes the neutrality zone smaller in a quite extreme sense, which reflects in a descriptive and intuitive manner a general result by [27] . For some further analysis we take the derivative of ( ) a w  w.r.t.  , for which we get by letting   , and As long as the income distribution is in the interiority zone the participation constraint for the matching mechanism is automatically satisfied, i.e. for any matching rate  with 0 1    both agents are better off in the matching equilibrium ( ) M  than in the original Nash equi-
. This follows since in the symmetrical situation considered here both agents have higher utility in the Pareto optimal outcome (1) M than in (0) M . Therefore, in Figure 4 ( contribution to the public good, this, however, no longer needs to be true even when preferences and matching rates are identical. This will be shown in the next section.
Corner solutions
We now assume that the income distribution lies outside the interiority zone, i.e. that agent For an exact description of agent 2's participation incentives in the Kolm triangle let 2 P be the point, at which the expansion path 1 ( ) e  of agent 1 intersects agent 2's indifference curve Figure 6 ). Agent 2 then is better off in the corner matching equilibrium than in the standard Nash equilibrium when the matching equilibrium lies on the segment 
Figure 6: Comparison between the interiority and the participation zone
It is a direct consequence of the monotonicity of expansion paths that 1 P lies to the left and 2 P to the right of ( ) M  . This implies that for any given 
The left hand side of (4) gives agent 2's utility when she is in 2 P (where her income is . This confirms that in this example the participation zone is larger than the interiority zone as graphically described by Figure 6 for the general case.
It generally holds that for the matching rate 1   the participation zone ˆ( 1) (1) K L is a nondegenerate interval while the interiority zone collapses into a straight line in this case.
Conclusion
It is well-known that in a public goods economy matching of public good contributions can successfully be employed to increase public good supply and to achieve a Pareto improvement over the conventional non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In this paper, it has been shown how the Kolm triangle method can be used to visualize important effects of matching in an elegant way, so basically the increase of public good supply through matching -be it unilateral or reciprocal. We describe in a quite intuitive way, how in a special situation (with identical preferences and identical matching rates) the interiority of matching equilibria depends on the income distribution and especially, how the "interiority zone", i.e. the range of income distributions leading to an interior matching equilibrium, is shrinking when the matching rate increases. Moreover, we were able to delimit the "participation zone" in the Kolm triangle, i.e.
the set of income distributions, for which the matching equilibrium becomes Pareto-superior to the original Nash equilibrium so that agents voluntarily enter the matching scheme. In this context, an important and novel insight has been that the participation zone is larger than the interiority zone, which means that also corner matching equilibria in which only one agent makes a positive flat contribution to the public good may make both agents better off. How this welfare effect can be generalized to the case of different utility functions and matching rates will be an issue of future research.
